Published Friday, 22 June, 2007 at 12:00 AM

Attorney-General and Minister for Justice and Minister Assisting the Premier in Western Queensland
The Honourable Kerry Shine

Senior Sergeant Chris Hurley

The Attorney-General, as first law officer, has independent powers to initiate criminal proceedings. These powers are exercised independently.

In Queensland, these powers are enshrined in the Attorney-General Act 1999. These powers have been exercised since Queensland became a separate colony in 1859.

The Queensland Police Union should be aware that the report of the Fitzgerald Inquiry highlighted the independent powers of the Attorney-General.

It said: "as chief law officer, the Attorney-General has extensive powers and discretions which are intended to be exercised in the public interest, including powers and discretion with respect to the initiation, prosecution, and discontinuance of criminal proceedings."

My decision in this case was to determine whether or not Senior Sergeant Chris Hurley should be put on trial, not whether he was guilty of an offence.

I took this decision in light of the opinion of former NSW Chief Justice Sir Laurence Street, who reviewed the material collated by the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) that had been provided to me. The DPP offered the file to me on 21 December last year.

Sir Laurence advised me that he believed there was sufficient admissible evidence to support the institution of criminal proceedings against Senior Sergeant Hurley for manslaughter of Mulrunji, and that there was a reasonable prospect of a conviction.

The decision to bring a prosecution was a legal one, based on legal advice and no other considerations. It was one only for me, in my role as first law officer.

In this case, a Justice of the Supreme Court of Queensland decided there was sufficient evidence to warrant the matter going to the jury to determine the verdict.

I respect the decision of the jury.

As I told State Parliament in February this year, the Attorney-General’s discretion to exercise these independent powers is not at odds with the doctrine of the separation of powers. Indeed, it is an exercise of the separation of powers for a matter to go to the court and left for the court/jury to decide free of any interference.

The Attorney-General’s power to bring an indictment is a power at law and does not infringe on the independence of the DPP.

21 June 2007